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ABSTRACT
In the social sciences, we often face normative questions, not least because many 
areas of inquiry intersect with public policy. Understanding and explaining media 
and communications is one task, deciding how communication systems should 
be organized quite another, but normative analysis receives scant attention. This 
article explores normative analysis: what is involved in answering questions about 
justice and communication, about how sociopolitical and indeed communicative 
arrangements ought to be organized.
Keywords: communication, technology, justice, normative analysis
Habermas1 famously lamented that the rise of publicity and entertainment 
was refeudalizing the public sphere. The work of Hall2 and many others 
has shown us how representations can significantly affect the social stand-
ing, opportunities, and even rights of minorities. More recently, a host of 
issues around privacy, ownership, and control of private data have gained 
widespread attention. Consider the myriad ways in which large platforms 
with deep pools of data can affect how people are represented, made visible, 
treated, and gain voice3; how injustices materialize in networked publics4; 
or how spirals of silence, trolls, and botnets can drown out legitimate 
voices, and become a mode of censorship.5 The list, of course, can go on. 
Max Hänska: Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit, London School of Economics
 1. Habermas.
 2. Hall and Gates.
 3. Taylor.
 4. Harvey and Leurs.
 5. Noelle-Neumann; Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas.
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The point is, scholarly and public discourse are suffused with appraisals 
of what is good and bad about communications, its technologies, and 
other communicative and informational resources. Our discourse is laced 
with reference to media and democracy, data and justice, communica-
tion and resistance, voice and representations of issues and minorities, 
media monopolies and power, the myriad ways in which social media 
are said to empower individuals, and warp democratic politics.6 These 
appraisals tread the peculiar terrain of normative thought. In a broader 
sense, they raise questions about what, if anything, justice requires of 
communication.
This essay does not answer that question, at least not directly. Rather, it 
will map the place of normative analysis in the communication field. By 
normative analysis I mean the ways we construct and justify normative 
arguments. While there are extensive discussions about methods of empir-
ical social research, the question what makes a normative claim plausible, 
robust, and worth endorsing receives slim to no attention. Even in political 
philosophy, normative analysis receives very little systematic explication. 
In the communications field claims about what is good and desirable, or 
bad and pernicious are usually asserted, such that the reader should already 
accept their rightness. Perhaps the distinction between right and wrong 
seems too obvious to us, to merit systematic attention. But I want to sug-
gest, that while critical appraisals of bad things we are against may come 
easily to us, it is much harder to say with precision what we are for. That 
is why this article aims to set out some basic parameters of normative 
analysis. What is involved in making assessments about the justness of 
communicative processes, practices, technologies, institutions, and other 
informational and communicative resources?
The focus will primarily be on communications, by which I mean pro-
cesses and practices of producing, expressing, disseminating, accessing, and 
receiving information and cultural artifacts. As communication practices 
and processes are often inseparable from technologies, media institutions, 
and communicative and informational resources, the discussion will touch 
upon these too. I have in mind questions about people’s ability to com-
municate, to express their views, to be heard, and to access information— 
questions about information quality, control over information, and 
representations.
 6. Althaus; Bucy and D’Angelo; Gerhards and Neidhardt.
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Normativity itself requires a brief definition. Tufekci recently wrote 
about the problem of data ownership and privacy that “we should all be 
thinking of ways to reintroduce competition into the digital economy. 
Imagine, for example, requiring that any personal data you consent to 
share be offered back to you in an ‘interoperable’ format, so that you could 
choose to work with companies you thought would provide you better 
service.”7 In the United Kingdom, a group of academics called on the 
press to “Stop Jeremy Corbyn’s trial by media.”8 What these quotes have 
in common, is that they express normative ideas. For Scanlon, normative 
questions are about the things that people have reasons to do. Thomson9  
dis tin guishes between normative propositions that are evaluatives and dir-
ectives. Tufekci’s statement is a directive: this is what we ought to be doing. 
The second statement is both evaluative and directive: what the media 
doing is bad. They should stop it. Both imply that there are good and 
important reasons for us to act in a different manner—even if the under-
lying reasons are not fully explicated.
At its simplest, normative statements (and theories) can be contrasted 
with empirical statements (and theories). While the latter describes the 
world as it is believed to be, the former tells us how it ought to be. The con-
cept of “direction of fit” can elucidate the distinction.10 Let us define theory 
as mental models (representations of the world, the way we think about or 
imagine something). Empirical theories have a mind-to-fit-world direction 
of fit, because they express a belief about how the world is believed to be. 
They aim to explain, or understand the world as it actually is. That is, we 
want our theories, our mental models, to represent (fit) the world as accu-
rately as possible. Normative theories have a world-to-fit-mind direction 
of fit, because they express a belief about how the world ought to be. That 
is, we want the world to conform more closely to our normative ideals, our 
mental models of how things should be. To say that something ought to 
be a particular way, implies that this imagined state manifests something 
desirable, valuable, and worthy of endorsement.11 We could say that norma-
tive statements are intentional, rather than descriptive or explanatory. But 
unlike the methods of empirical analysis, that will be familiar to the reader, 
 7. Tufekci, “Opinion. We Already Know How to Protect Ourselves.”
 8. Letters.
 9. Thomson.
 10. Humberstone.
 11. Gibbard; Korsgaard; Wedgwood.
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we have far less understanding of what makes a good normative theory, 
because we are generally less familiar with normative analysis.
This essay will not focus on normative questions in general, but on 
a narrower set of questions concerning ideas of justice. Many normative 
questions concerning the actions of individuals or institutions are properly 
understood as ethical questions. For the purpose of this article I will define 
ethics as primarily concerned with individual decision making, with the 
question “How should I act?” and the attendant question, “What is involved 
in living a good life?” Justice involves not questions about individual 
actions (what should I do), or actions between individuals (how should 
I treat you, what do we owe each other), but with such questions as they 
arise across society. It is concerned with the principles for organizing wider 
social relations, what we owe one another across a society. Justice concerns 
our common life, how it should be ordered, what good government (and 
governance) looks like. Often questions of justice are concerned with the 
organization of the state. Yet, as our communication systems become ever 
more central to the structuring and organization of social and political 
relations, they too must become subject to considerations of justice.12 In 
short, what I mean by justice is an ideal in which social, political, and 
indeed communicative arrangements are what they ought to be.13 It con-
cerns questions about what makes such arrangements good and right.
To illustrate the distinction between justice and ethics, consider the 
following propositions.
A: By right, you may insult Peter.
B: You should not insult Peter.
Both are normative statements in that they contain directives. They are 
statements about how the world ought to be. But we can interpret (A) as a 
statement about the requirements of justice and (B) as a statement about 
the requirements of ethical behavior. Not to insult people is a sound ethical 
principle (i.e., because it avoids rudeness and possible offence). It answers 
the question what one ought to do in a given situation, but is not necessar-
ily a good principle for organizing wider social relations. In asking how we 
should act, we are not necessarily concerned with questions of justice. It is not 
a contradiction to say that while you shouldn’t insult Peter, you nevertheless 
 12. See, for example, Fisher.
 13. Michelman.
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may. Affirming self-expression (i.e., because of its central  importance to 
autonomy and the pursuit of truth), even of views we find distasteful, is a 
statement on how social and political arrangements across society ought to 
be organized. The distinction is important, because A and B clash. But prin-
ciples of justice are of a higher order than those of ethical behavior—at least 
if we accept that human autonomy and truth should enjoy priority in our 
social ordering over the avoidance of rudeness and offence.14 In this respect, 
an action can be consistent with justice, but unethical.
In exploring normative analysis, my primary aim is to expand the 
discussion about what makes good normative theories for the commu-
nications field. Normative work clearly has a strong appeal in the field. 
After all, media and communications scholarship is rich in critical evalua-
tions. Evidently, many scholars are eager to address wrongs and injustices 
through their work. Sadly, critical appraisals outweigh positive visions of 
how we may move toward a more just state of affairs. Admittedly, it is 
easier to know what we are against, than to say precisely what we are for. 
That is why a secondary aim of this essay is to encourage the development 
of positive conceptions of what justice demands of communication and its 
technologies. By encouraging and broadening systematic engagement with 
normative analysis I hope to encourage and contribute to the development 
of systematic and rigorous conceptions of communication justice.
Section one of the essay outlines the basic elements that ideas of justice 
typically consist of. While the essay does not advance a particular con-
ception of justice, it will endorse a republican conception of freedom as 
 nondomination for illustrative purposes. Section two outlines a taxon-
omy that distinguishes between communication as a means to, and end of 
justice. It asks what gives certain communicative processes, practices, 
technologies, institutions, and other informational and communicative 
resources exceptional value, meriting special protection. I argue that this 
taxonomy is important if we are to approach questions of justice in a 
systematic and consistent manner within the communication field.
Goods, Principles, and Procedures
There are two justice-related questions that normative analysis tries to 
answer. Floyd refers to these as the organizing question: How should we 
 14. Ash.
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arrange our sociopolitical order? and the foundational question: What 
 justifies our answer?15 Here, I will focus primarily on the organizing ques-
tion. The question what our social, political (and indeed communicative) 
arrangements ought to be is, in the broadest sense, a question about what 
justice consists of. Most answers to this question involve stipulations 
about (a) essential or primary goods (things that are essential to every-
one), (b) principles that tell us how these should be distributed, and/or 
(c)  procedural principles that tell us how to decide matters of (a) and (b).
Primary Goods
Answering the organizing question always involves some “currency” in 
terms of which an idea of justice is articulated. Currencies are those essen-
tial, substantive, key, or primary goods (as Rawls16 calls them in his Theory 
of Justice) that justice should secure. They are those things anyone would 
need to live a good life, the universal means needed for obtaining human 
ends. Different traditions of justice reach different assessments of the kind 
of things people have universal reasons to value. For Rawls,17 these include 
economic resources (welfare, jobs, entitlements) and liberties. For Nozick18 
and Scanlon19 rights and freedoms, a different conception of freedom for 
Pettit20, and resources for Dworkin.21 For Sen22 and Nussbaum23 the capa-
bilities required to realize key functionings,24 for Utilitarians like Singer, 
Mill, or Bentham welfare, pleasure, or happiness. All of these are goods 
that one can reasonably argue are needed for living a good life, be it some 
resources, freedoms, and rights, or the actual capability to realize a right 
or freedom. Put simply, saying that a certain set of arrangements is just, 
is to say that it distributes those goods that are needed to live well in the 
right way.
Primary goods also provide standards for appraising justice: are rights 
and freedoms obtained, functionings realized, welfare maximized, or 
 15. Floyd.
 16. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
 17. Ibid.
 18. Nozick.
 19. Scanlon.
 20. Pettit, Republicanism.
 21. Dworkin.
 22. Sen.
 23. Nussbaum.
 24. See also Schejter and Tirosh.
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necessary resources available. Shifting the focus onto communicative 
goods, the question may be whether people enjoy the rights, resources, 
and/or capability to access quality information, or whether they are able 
to freely express legitimate grievances. While it is tempting to compile 
an extensive list of primary goods (who, after all, could disagree that all 
the goods listed above are important), considered parsimony makes for a 
better answer to the organizing question. After all, different goods can come 
into conflict with each other: ensuring everyone has sufficient resources 
may conflict with the right to private property, for instance. In the domain 
of communication, the right to free expression may conflict with the pro-
vision of quality information. To deal with such conflicts requires us to 
establish a priority between different goods, to decide which we have the 
most fundamental reasons to value.
Principles
The reader might have an inkling that an answer to the organizing question 
that merely stipulated a set of primary goods justice should secure would 
be incomplete. Justice, after all, is concerned with the obligations people 
have toward each other across society. We could stipulate that everyone 
should have the capability to express themselves, and the resources neces-
sary to access quality information. However, if this is not already the case, 
stipulating that a certain communication right, resource or capability is a 
key good, is insufficient. We must also say how this good is to be allocated, 
and how the burden of its provision is to be distributed. Are individuals, 
families, or groups entitled to these goods? And is it local communities, 
states, technology, or media companies, the most advantaged, or everyone 
globally who is obliged to help provide them? Theories of justice differ 
not only on their list of primary goods, but also on the principles used to 
determine their allocation.
Part two of Rawl’s25 second principle of justice, known as the “differ-
ence principle” is one means for determining when a redistribution of 
some resource or good is permissible: namely, when it benefits the least 
advantaged members of society. In the context of freedom and equality 
of expression, the difference principle may guide us in considering ques-
tions of media ownership. For instance, that “an increased concentration 
in media ownership is permitted only if it will benefit the representation of 
 25. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
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the most marginalized voices in society, and hence can be seen to increase 
the pluralism of information and perspectives available in the media.”26 
Contrast this with utilitarian theories of justice, for instance, whose cen-
tral principle is to maximize the aggregate good (e.g., happiness, pleasure, 
voice). Utilitarian theories would thus permit a change in the concentra-
tion of media ownership or power if it increased aggregate representation 
of voice, even if it did not improve, or even worsened the situation of the 
least advantaged.
An answer to the organizing question that defines a fixed set of pri-
mary goods and invariable principles for their allocation is referred to as 
a substantive conception of justice, because its parameters fix the distri-
bution of primary goods our social and political arrangements ought to 
secure. However, at least since Rawls, political theory has recognized social 
pluralism, the diversity of cultural values and ways of life (what Rawls 
calls “comprehensive doctrines”), as a key challenge for theories of justice. 
Rawls asked whether it was “possible for there to exist over time a just and 
stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided 
by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”27 Pluralism is 
the hard problem bedeviling answers to the organizing question. Because 
providing a fixed definition of primary goods and their ideal distribution, 
also fixes what a good or just society should ultimately look like, it is a 
matter of controversy whether substantive conceptions of justice can truly 
accommodate social pluralism.
Pluralism exposes substantive conceptions to the critique of ethno-
centrisms, for how can they justify universal value of their conception in 
culturally impartial ways? How can it be guaranteed that the substantive 
goods stipulated are similarly valued by different members of pluralistic 
societies? After all, primary goods (as universal means to human ends) and 
their distribution should be sufficiently general to allow all of us to value 
them independently of the specific lives we want to live, our cultural, or 
religious heritage. To address the challenge of pluralism most answers to 
the organizing question involve some procedural principles: Rather than 
providing a fixed definition of just social and political arrangements, they 
define procedures through which these arrangements should be decided. 
Procedural (rather than substantive) answers to the organizing question 
 26. Hänska; see also Chapter 3 in Schejter and Tirosh.
 27. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 4.
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want to remain sensitive to the pluralism of views in society by involving 
those who live within a sociopolitical order in affirming its parameters.
Procedures
Procedural conceptions of justice attempt solve the challenge of pluralism 
by avoiding ex ante substantive commitments to a particular combination 
of primary goods and principles. Instead they stipulate some kind of inclu-
sive (imagined or real) process for deciding the contours of justice itself. 
Rather than offer a substantive answer to the question “What do just social 
arrangements require?”, they provide us with a method for answering the 
question. In this sense, procedural conceptions are not directly concerned 
with primary goods and their allocation, but with legitimate and fair 
ways of deciding which primary goods should be distributed and how.28  
The advantage of procedural conceptions is that they are supposed to be 
more sensitive to pluralism. Incorporating the democratic axiom that 
those bound by the law should partake in shaping it, justice resides not 
in the ideal allocation of universally valued primary goods, but in the pro-
cess through which we come to determine a specific allocation of goods. 
Procedures are open ended, such that the shape of just social arrangements 
may change through time and circumstance. What matters to justice in 
the procedural view is not, above all, whether a set of substantive condi-
tions are met, but whether the process through which arrangements are 
decided and put in place meets a set of procedural conditions.
Most procedural theories build on some variant of the idea of pub-
lic reason to specify the procedural standards that decisions should meet. 
Rawls, for instance, makes provisions for reasonableness of those engaged 
in the process of deciding the shape of justice, for the notional person 
behind his “veil of ignorance.” Deliberative democrats circumscribe 
deliberation, and make requirements for inclusiveness, rationality, and 
the quality of argument, which aim to place constraints on the process 
of deciding just arrangements—those famous requirements often known 
as the “Habermasian public sphere.” Agonistic pluralists counter that the 
requirements of deliberation are too onerous and restrictive, that they 
 28. In distinguishing procedural from substantive conceptions, sometimes a distinction is 
made between justice and legitimacy, where the former is a feature of sociopolitical arrange-
ments, and the latter a feature of procedures. Here justice resides in the legitimacy of the process, 
and implies an obligation to accept its results. See Pettit, “Legitimacy and Justice in Republican 
Perspective.”
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sanitize debate by removing legitimate voices that do not meet its restrictive 
constraints.29 While Nussbaum30 stipulates a list of 11 central capabilities, 
Sen31 declines to do so, favoring local deliberative processes for determin-
ing salient capabilities because deliberation is more sensitive to pluralism. 
Sen also deploys comparative approaches for identifying the most pressing 
injustices, rather than developing a comprehensive but abstract conception 
of perfect justice.
A Balance Between Procedures and Substantive Outcomes
Most conceptions of justice are a mixture of substance and procedure. 
Rawls32 balances substantive stipulations with hypothetical procedures 
(the “veil of ignorance”) for determining how predefined primary goods 
(resources and liberties) should be allocated. Deliberative democrats tilt 
the balance decisively toward procedures, with the aim of giving just social 
arrangement dialogic, intersubjective foundations, by emphasizing com-
municative processes for deciding what allocation of which goods justice 
requires.33
Procedures are (ostensibly) more sensitive to pluralism, because they 
seek everyone’s input, they should be fair and not prejudice the outcome, 
thus making space for various comprehensive doctrines. Yet, we would 
also reject a procedure if its substantive outcome is perceived as unjust. 
Imagine an inclusive and fair deliberative process through which all men 
and women decided by consensus that all future decisions should be made 
only by women. This is why many theories of justice try to strike a balance 
between procedures and substantive conceptions, usually making provi-
sions, which constrain procedures. As noted, for instance, deliberative 
democrats stipulate conditions of reasonableness and rationality, which 
agonistic democrats deem too restrictive. Liberal democracies employ 
institutions to constrain fickle and capricious shifts in public will.
The distinction between substantive and procedural conceptions of 
justice bears emphasizing, because communication can play a critical role 
in both. Liberty is hard to conceive without the right to free expression—as 
such communication can be critical to substantive conceptions of justice. 
 29. See Mouffe.
 30. Nussbaum.
 31. Sen.
 32. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
 33. Chambers.
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But expression, quality of information, debate, and deliberation are also 
the lifeblood of procedural conceptions of justice.
Organizing Ideal
Earlier on I suggested, following Floyd, that normative analysis seeks to 
answer two key questions: the organizing question (how should we arrange 
our sociopolitical order) and the foundational question (what justifies our 
answer). Whether we find the justification for a particular conception of 
justice compelling—whether normative analysis sways us—often depends 
on whether we are already committed to some underlying value. I call 
these underlying values organizing ideals, but we could also refer to them 
as primary political values. They are, in a sense, the bedrock of justice.
Organizing ideals undergird every conception of justice, sometimes 
lurking in the background without being explicitly articulated. We 
 cannot make sense of deliberative ideals, unless we recognize that they 
rest on some prior commitment to reason and autonomy. Rawls’s concep-
tion of justice rests on some prior commitment to freedom and equality. 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s on a commitment to human flourishing. There are 
many possible organizing ideals, including individual freedom (under-
stood as nonintervention or nondomination), autonomy, reason, and 
equality. Similarly, general welfare, community, flourishing, or happiness 
are all potential organizing ideals. To endorse one of these is not to say 
that others are unimportant, but to establish a priority between them, 
to say which is a primary, and which a subordinate value. For example, 
we may value equality, but its appeal may be based on some prior com-
mitment to nondomination, in that the value of equality derives from 
a prior commitment to freedom from domination. Clarity about the 
organizing ideal we are committed to helps us work out which primary 
goods, principles, and procedures are consistent with and conducive to 
this ideal. We could say that primary goods, principles, and procedures 
are constitutive of the organizing ideal, things that are substantively part 
of what it means to be free or equal, for example. It is worth noting that 
procedural conceptions encounter a problem of circularity here: On the 
one hand, procedures are supposed to be more sensitive to pluralism 
because they avoid prior commitments to fixed ideals, yet the parameters 
we stipulate for procedures (e.g., reasonableness, equal participation) can 
only be justified by appeal to some organizing ideal. In Box 1, I sketch 
a communicative conception of justice based on the organizing ideal of 
freedom as nondomination.
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Box 1 Freedom as Nondomination
The aim of this essay is to explore normative analysis in the communica-
tion field. To put flesh on the subject matter, let me commit to an orga-
nizing ideal for illustrative purposes. Though I find this ideal personally 
compelling, it is not necessary for the reader to share this commitment. Let 
us then take freedom as the most basic political value, as our organizing 
ideal. More specifically, let us commit to a notion of freedom understood 
as nondomination rather than noninterference.34 For it is conceivable to 
be free of external interference but still subject to domination, in that 
the  freedom enjoyed depends on the largesse of others (e.g., a benign 
dictator) who may rescind this freedom at any time. In other words, we 
may be free but at risk of arbitrary interference. Consider the freedom to 
communicate that social media platforms afford. Yet these platforms also 
offer expansive opportunities for control and domination to those who 
control the social graph. Our communications are free (in a sense) but 
we are at risk of uncontrolled and arbitrary interference from others, and 
thus subject to domination. Note also, that a commitment to freedom as 
nondomination as organizing ideal does not discount other values such 
as equality or flourishing, but that it establishes a priority. If and when we 
face trade-offs between freedom and other values, freedom has priority.
Our tentative answer to the organizing question could place the 
onus on proceduralism, in that social and political arrangements free 
of domination are best achieved through processes of collective choice 
that remain open ended (where every choice is temporary, and subject 
to potential revision in the future). Choice includes important com-
municative elements. Let us suggest two key communicative goods 
that justice should secure: (1) the capability to express legitimate 
grievances and have these recognized and (2) the resource of qual-
ity information. The continuous presence of countervailing voices is 
critical to prevent domination, and quality information is essential to 
human autonomy. Theses goods are to be allocated in such a manner 
that they have the greatest benefit for those most vulnerable to dom-
ination. This sketch of a normative analysis  stipulates two communi-
cative goods, a principle for their allocation, conceived as procedural 
constituents of the organizing ideal of  freedom as nondomination.
 34. Pettit, Republicanism; Shapiro.
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Communicative Means and Ends of Justice
So far I have argued that we should attune ourselves to the nature of norma-
tive analysis. That when we make normative claims these are either evalua-
tive or directive, statements about how things ought to be. And that justice 
concerns the organizing question: how sociopolitical relations should be 
organized more generally, not questions that pertain only to individual 
actions. Answering the organizing question usually involves a combination 
of stipulating primary goods that justice should secure, principles governing 
their allocation, and (or sometimes alternatively) procedures to help decide 
what kind of goods justice should secure and how it should distribute these.
The aim here is to locate communication in ideas of justice. The key 
question is how communication is related to sources of value: namely, 
to organizing ideals, primary goods, principals, and procedures. How 
do  certain communicative processes, practices (capabilities), technolo-
gies, institutions, and other informational and communicative resources 
derive value? I propose that they can derive value in one of three ways: 
Communication can be constitutive of justice (an end of justice), and 
intrinsically valuable, either as (1) substantive good, or because of its 
(2) procedural value. Communication can also be (3) a means to justice, 
in that it can be causally necessary for us to obtain some primary or proce-
dural good, and thus extrinsically valuable (see Table 1).
Communication as a Substantive End of Justice
Specific communicative processes, practices (capabilities), technologies, 
institutions, and other informational and communicative resources can 
be intrinsically valuable. When communication has intrinsic value, this 
table 1 How communication can relate to justice
Procedural Justice Substantive Justice
Ends/Constitutive value Communication as key to  
procedural conceptions of justice, 
for instance, in  deliberation. Here 
 procedures and processes are seen 
as constitutive of the organizing 
ideal, and the locus of justice 
itself.
Some communication  
practices, capabilities  
(e.g., expression), or 
resources (e.g., quality 
information) can be viewed 
as substantive goods in their 
own right.
Means/Derivative value Communication as a means of achieving justice, as central to 
nonideal theories of justice.
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is either because it is a substantive good in its own right, or because it is 
 central to a procedural conception of justice. In either case, communica-
tion is constitutive of an organizing ideal, and can therefore be understood 
as an end of justice itself.
Substantive conceptions of justice, as outlined above, define primary 
goods that we should all have reasons to value, as the grounds on which 
justice is assessed. Depending on our answer to the organizing question, 
some communication rights or capabilities could be conceived as such 
 primary goods. We can value self-expression and voice as primary goods,35 
for instance, because expression can be viewed as the very substance of 
freedom. Similarly, we could include access to quality information, or the 
right to privacy, as the most basic goods that anyone would need to live 
a flourishing life. Though expression, voice, privacy, and information by 
no means exhaust the list of possible primary goods (depending on the 
underlying organizing ideal to which we are committed) they could all be 
said to have intrinsic normative value. That is, we can argue that they are 
not merely related to, derivative from, or supportive of justice, but sub-
stantially constitutive of some organizing ideal (e.g., freedom, flourishing, 
general  welfare). Just sociopolitical arrangements thus prevail to the extent 
that a fair distribution of these goods is secured.
Communication as Procedural End of Justice
A procedure, rather than as a specific state of affairs, could also be our 
answer to the organizing question. Here, key communicative practices 
(capabilities), technologies, institutions, and other informational and com-
municative resources have substantive procedural value (because they are 
important to the legitimacy of deciding on sociopolitical arrangements). For 
deliberative democrats, for example, communication is  critical for reaching 
a consensus, accommodating differences, and facilitating a process of trans-
forming people’s preferences through rational debate. For Sen, deliberation 
is the process through which communities determine locally critical capa-
bilities, their provision, and distribution. Many procedural conceptions of 
justice build on the organizing ideal of public  reason, which is supposed to 
be engendered in public discourse and debate. Communication is intrin-
sic to the exercise of public reason. And rational and inclusive collective 
choices (through which the parameters of social order are to be determined) 
 35. Ash; Couldry; see Table 2.
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are considered to be the very locus of justice. Rather than providing a 
substantive answer to the organizing questions, in proceduralism the just-
ness of social-political arrangements depends on them being open to revi-
sion through fair and legitimate processes of collective choice.
Consider the organizing ideal of freedom as nondomination (see 
Boxes 1–3). Because most societies are pluralistic, a substantial risk of injus-
tice emerges from the possibility of some group losing its autonomy as 
another group becomes dominant and imposes its preferred order on every-
one else—in which case one group would get what it wants, but all others 
would be subject to uncontrolled interference. Pluralism of competing forces 
countervails the risk of any one group becoming dominant. Expressing ones 
views and interests, and having these recognized, is a desideratum of such a 
countervailing force, and can be viewed as constitutive of political arrange-
ments free of domination. Repurposing Rawls’s difference principle we may 
suggest that the voices of those most vulnerable to domination should enjoy 
priority, for instance. Here, the capability to express legitimate grievances is 
valued intrinsically because it constitutes the substance of nondomination 
(see Box 2). It is a procedural good central to the legitimacy of the processes 
in which justice resides.36 Deliberativeness, reasonableness, or participation 
could also be procedural goods, the absence of which would signal a certain 
injustice or illegitimacy of prevailing social and political arrangements.
 36. Besley and McComas; Schaefer.
Box 2 A Procedural Conception of Nondomination
In the procedural conception of freedom as nondomination outlined 
in Box 1, domination is countervailed by fostering two communicative 
goods: (1) The capability to express legitimate grievances and have these 
recognized and (2) the provision of quality information. In this view, 
quality information is a substantive good, because the autonomy that 
nondomination should secure could not be realized without  reliable 
information on which to base individual choices. The  practices 
and institutions that provide quality information have  derivative 
(extrinsic) value. The capability to express legitimate grievances and 
have these recognized is a procedural good (with intrinsic value), in 
that it is constitutive of arrangements that are free of domination. 
It countervails domination, and serves as an indicator of freedom.
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Communication as a Means to Justice
Normative analysis should not only be concerned with answering the 
 organizing question, but also with how an idea of justice can be realized. 
Rawls famously distinguished between ideal and nonideal theory.37 Ideal 
theory concerns the definition of what justice consists in, and the jus-
tification of that definition. Nonideal theory concerns the realization of 
justice. This three-way distinction—between nonideal and ideal theories, 
and within ideal theory between substantive and procedural concep-
tions—augments our understanding of what a just society demands of 
communication. While communicative processes, practices, technologies, 
institutions, and other informational and communicative resources can be 
ends of justice (i.e., constitutive of substantive or procedural conceptions 
of justice), they can also be a means to justice. They can be important 
components of nonideal theories.
There is a critical difference: if the capability to express legitimate 
 grievances is constitutive of justice, it is sacrosanct. If, however, it is a 
means to justice (see Table 2), then it is not sacrosanct. Let us assume 
our  organizing ideal is equality of welfare, then affording someone a voice 
can be a means to equality, in that it can help us detect salient inequal-
ities. But the capability of expression would only be valuable insofar as 
it helps ensure a more equal distribution of welfare. Here, capability of 
expression itself is not constitutive of our idea of justice, and does not 
necessarily guarantee it. Things change, of course, if it is equality of voice 
that we are aiming for. Yet, if we are seeking equality of voice, then the 
 37. Simmons.
table 2 The capability of expression as a means to, or end of justice
Free expression as 
substantive end
The capability of expression has intrinsic value, as a substantive part 
of justice.
Free expression as a 
procedural end
The capability of expression is an important part of fair and 
 legitimate processes of collective choice, which themselves constitute 
 nondomination. As such, voice has intrinsic procedural value.
Free expression as 
means
The capability of expression as means to secure equal distribution of 
welfare, for example.
Some also argue that inclusive deliberation will help reach consensus, 
while others argue that it may actually increase disengagement.
Insofar as it secures some of these goods it has extrinsic (secondary or 
derivative) value.
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capability of expression may not suffice either. Consider the following: 
social media may afford everyone a nominal voice, yet that voice may well 
go unheard. On social media it is more effective to drown out voices you 
find  undesirable (e.g., using botnets and sock-puppet accounts to flood 
platforms with preferred voices), rather than to censor and suppress them. 
Perhaps the thing we are seeking to secure is not expression as such, but 
having legitimate grievances acknowledged—in which case the capability 
of expression may be a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) means for 
obtaining our ends.
Consider another example, the provision of high-quality  information, 
and the role of journalism, media institutions, and technology  platforms 
in securing access thereto. Is it high-quality information as such that 
is  valued, or does it serve as a proxy for political knowledge? Political 
 knowledge is generally regarded essential to the proper functioning of 
democracy.38 Floridi’s39 information ethics is premised on the value of qual-
ity information to ethical decision making. But journalism may not nec-
essarily ensure political knowledge. The recent abundance of what Wardle 
and Derakhshan40 call “information disorder”—the proliferation of 
mis- and disinformation—reveals a tension between the means (provision 
of quality information) and the ends (political knowledge). We may not 
suffer a paucity of high-quality information, but an overwhelming volume 
of low-quality, even disinformation, that muddies the water, drowning-out 
high-quality information. Assuming this analysis is accurate, lack of polit-
ical knowledge may not be caused by the absence of quality information, 
but by the prominence and cacophony of bad information. Therefore, 
increasing the provision of high-quality information may not necessarily 
be the most effective means of ensuring a well-informed citizenry.
A final example includes some strands of deliberative democracy, 
which hold that the aim of deliberative communication is to narrow dis-
agreements, facilitate learning, transform preferences, or even mitigate 
cognitive biases.41 Here deliberative communication has extrinsic value, 
derived from its ability to change minds, improve political knowledge, 
and facilitate decision making by bridging differences, converging opin-
ions, and facilitating agreement. Often inclusion of a diversity of voices 
 38. Nielsen; Schudson.
 39. Floridi.
 40. Wardle and Derakhshan.
 41. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond; “Deliberative Democracy in Divided 
Societies.”
This content downloaded from 86.159.144.20 on Mon, 25 Feb 2019 09:31:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Normative Analysis in the Communications Field        31
is considered critical to deliberation, yet as Mutz’s42 seminal work has 
shown, people often tend to disengage from processes the more they are 
exposed to  different opinions. Ensuring the greatest diversity of voices may 
not  necessarily facilitate agreement, but rather increase disengagement. 
Similarly, we may stipulate maximum inclusion to increase the subjective 
legitimacy of  collective decision-making processes (i.e., whether a decision 
is  perceived as legitimate by participants). But an inclusive, participatory 
choice  process will not necessarily yield greater perceived legitimacy than 
a less participatory process. Britain’s EU referendum was more partic-
ipatory than a parliamentary decision, yet a decision by parliamentary 
delegates could plausibly have enjoyed greater (cross-cutting) perceived 
legitimacy than the referendum outcome does.
The distinction between means and ends may seem immaterial, 
but it has profound consequences for our thinking about the place of 
 communicative processes, practices, technologies, institutions, and other 
informational and communicative resources in conceptions of  justice, 
and for understanding what justice requires of communication. When 
communication is regarded as a substantive end or constitutive of some 
 procedural conception of justice, the issue is quite simple. The absence of 
relevant communicative processes, capabilities, or other informational and 
 communicative resources would indicate a degree of injustice. However, 
things get more complicated when we think of communication as a means 
to justice, where its presence or absence serves at best as a proxy measure 
for evaluating justice.
When the value of communications derives from some other good 
it can help us obtain (such as autonomy, political knowledge, equality, 
 agreement, or subjective legitimacy), it is not intrinsically valuable, but 
valued as a means. But means are not sacrosanct. They are potentially 
 fungible, substitutable without detrimentally affecting the overall just-
ness of social arrangements. Constitutive elements of justice (its ends) are 
sacrosanct, and cannot be substituted. For instance, journalism may be 
sufficient but unnecessary for securing quality information (making it a 
means). And quality information may be necessary but insufficient for 
ensuring political knowledge (making it an end). Insofar as something 
other than good journalism could help obtain quality information, justice 
would not suffer the absence of journalism. As political knowledge is 
impossible without quality information, its absence would detrimentally 
 42. Mutz.
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affect justice. In this view, journalism’s value is derivative, but that of qual-
ity information is constitutive. Similarly, agreement between members of 
society may be a desideratum of procedural conceptions of justice, but 
maximizing the inclusion of voices may not actually be the best way of 
facilitating agreement. Insofar as something other than the widest inclu-
sion of voices could help obtain an agreement, justice would not suffer 
the absence of some voices. However, hearing and acknowledging the 
diversity of voices present in society (particularly of its most marginalized 
 members), is necessary for ensuring nondomination (see Box 3).
Normative analysis also requires us to carefully parse the trade-offs 
involved in prioritizing different organizing ideals and their constitutive 
goods, all of which we have significant reasons to value. This is an import-
ant task, especially if we want to offer a positive vision of communica-
tion justice that articulates what we are for (rather than limiting ourselves 
to critical assessments of those things we are against). For instance, we 
can value both the capability of expression and quality information, but 
under certain circumstances the two can compete and even collide—
ensuring high-quality information will require us to privilege some voices 
(e.g., those of experts) over others. As we have seen, inclusive participation 
and subjective legitimacy can also become rivalrous: After all, more inclu-
sive participation may reduce perceived legitimacy and engagement. On 
the other hand, a political decision may be widely viewed as legitimate, 
even if it was not particularly inclusive and participatory.
If our thinking on the place of communication in ideas of justice is to 
hit the ground of practice, clarity is needed on the priorities that different 
communicative practices and resources enjoy. How to prioritize voices if 
not all can be heard? How to prioritize between expression and quality 
information? Prioritizing requires clarity about the organizing ideal we 
endorse, from which the value of primary goods, principles, and procedures 
Box 3 The Means and Ends to Freedom as Nondomination
Journalism has extrinsic value as a sufficient but unnecessary means 
to quality information. As such, journalism and its institutions 
are potentially substitutable. The capability to express legitimate 
 grievances and have these recognized is necessary but not necessarily 
sufficient for insuring nondomination. As such expression is an end 
of justice with substantive procedural value.
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ultimately derives. It requires clarity on whether the  communicative 
 practice or resource in question has intrinsic or extrinsic value. Properly 
parsing such trade-offs, under full considerations of competing values and 
the reasons lending them support, is what normative analysis is about.
Concluding Remarks
In this essay, I have been concerned with normative questions, more 
 specifically questions about justice in the communications field. I have sug-
gested that justice concerns the question how social and political  relations 
should be organized—and the role communications ought to play in this 
organization. I have not attempted to offer a direct answer, but rather to 
shed some light on what is involved in answering such questions. If we are 
to think about what justice demands of communication, and to formulate 
robust normative views about media and communications, then we are 
engaged in the underappreciated enterprise of normative analysis. The fact 
that much social research takes its cue from a certain value- orientation, 
only underscores its relevance. Moreover, if we conclude empirical work 
with reflections on the broader significance of our findings, with an 
 assessment of what is good, bad, or valuable about the phenomena we 
study, we should better be clear about how communication derives value.43 
We should know not only what we are against, but also articulate clearly 
what we are for. To that end, I hope this article can provide an impetus. 
That it can help us to understand the trade-offs and contradictions 
between different ways of valuing communication, that become essential 
in making informed assessments about what is good and bad about various 
communicative processes, practices, technologies, institutions, and other 
informational and communicative resources.
I want to end with a call for parsimony, that we carefully consider which 
specific communicative phenomena can (should) be usefully parsed in the 
language of justice, and why. Certainly, many communicative phenomena 
raise salient ethical considerations (questions about how they impact the 
quality of people’s lives), but do not necessarily have any immediate pur-
chase on questions of justice, because they are not immediately salient to 
wider questions about how a society ought to arrange its social and political 
affairs. The privacy of family photos shared online, or the kind of content 
 43. Althaus.
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suitable to be aired pre- and post-watershed certainly raise ethical issues. 
But they do not have any immediate purchase on questions of justice. Not 
all communication is “justice apt.” That is, not all communication is perti-
nent to questions of justice, and we must avoid conceptual overstretch, the 
familiar effort to shoehorn phenomena into a particular conceptual space 
where all kinds of things are to be parsed in terms of justice. At the same 
time, just because something is not justice apt, does not mean it is not 
valuable. But insofar as we believe that communication is justice salient, 
we need to know why. And knowing why requires us to understand what 
the underlying values are that determine communication’s relationship to 
justice. Does communication have intrinsic value as a constituent of jus-
tice? Or, does it have extrinsic value because of its relationship to some 
primary good that, in turn, is a constituent of justice?
Finally, no communication right, resource or capability alone will be 
sufficient for justice to obtain—it would be absurd to claim that arrang-
ing our communicative processes, practices, technologies, institutions, and 
other informational and communicative resources in the right way is all 
that justice required. Nonetheless, communication can be an  important 
 component of justice, and under conditions of pluralism it is hard to 
 imagine how justice could be realized without communications that help 
mediate between society’s various interests, views, and ethical outlooks. 
It is also hard to imagine how people can become autonomous absent 
high-quality information to base their choices on—they may still be 
making their own choices, but those choices would less likely deliver the 
intended outcome. Good communication does not guarantee justice, but 
under conditions of pluralism it is essential and necessary for its pursuit.
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